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Self-as-Subject and Experiential 
Ownership
Caleb Liang
In what follows, I investigate the distinction between the sense of self-as-object
and the sense of self-as-subject, and propose an account that is different from
Shoemaker’s immunity principle. I suggest that this distinction can be elucidated
by examining two types of self-experience: the sense of body ownership and the
sense of  experiential ownership.  The former concerns self-as-object:  whether a
body  part  or  a  full  body  belongs  to  me.  The  latter  concerns  self-as-subject:
whether I represent myself as the unique subject of experience. A key point is that
misrepresentation can occur not only in the sense of body ownership but also in
the sense of experiential ownership. Then I examine the most relevant neuros-
cientific accounts of the sense of self-as-subject, including Damasio’s account of
the core-self, Panksepp’s affective neuroscience, neural synchrony, and the sub-
cortical-cortical midline structures. I  argue that none of these successfully ex-
plains the neural basis of the sense of self-as-subject. In order to make progress, I
suggest, the first step is to look for and then to study the various conditions in
which one can pursue the “Wittgenstein Question”.
Keywords
Body ownership | Core-self | Experiential ownership | Immunity principle | Neural

























This paper investigates a central form of self-
consciousness  from  an  interdisciplinary  per-
spective: the sense of self-as-subject.1 How philo-
sophers  understand this  form of  consciousness
has been influenced by two ideas. One is Wit-
tgenstein’s distinction between “I”-as-object and
1 Here  I  will  focus  on  the  minimal  sense  of  self-as-subject,  which
means that the sense of self-as-subject does not require exercising
conceptual capacities and can be transient. It is contrasted with the
“narrative self”  or “autobiographical  self”,  which involves  episodic
memory and persists through time (Gallagher 2000). 
“I”-as-subject. In the Blue Book (1958), he says
that: “there is no question of recognizing a per-
son when I say I have toothache. To ask ‘are
you sure it is  you who have pains?’ would be
nonsensical”.  The  other  is  Shoemaker’s  im-
munity principle. Developing Wittgenstein’s dis-
tinction,  Shoemaker (1968) argues that we are
“immune to error through misidentification rel-
ative to the first-person pronouns (IEM)”. Many
consider IEM to be solely addressing semantic
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or  conceptual  issues.  But  for  philosophers  of
mind, it decisively sets apart two types of self-
consciousness. When one is conscious of oneself-
as-object,  error  is  always  possible;  however,
when one  is  conscious  of  oneself-as-subject,  a
particular sort of mistake about who the subject
is becomes impossible. 
The first goal of this paper is to propose
an alternative explication of the sense of self-as-
object and the sense of self-as-subject. I aim to
provide an account that is both phenomenolo-
gically precise and empirically useful. The dis-
tinction,  I  will  suggest,  can  be  better  under-
stood as two types of self-experience: a sense of
body ownership and a sense of experiential own-
ership.  I  will  argue  that  sometimes  it  makes
perfect sense to ask a subject “are you sure it is
you who feels pain?” For brevity, I will call this
type of question the “Wittgenstein Question”. I
will also argue that IEM, or at least some ver-
sions of it, faces counterexamples from empirical
research. The second goal of this paper is to ex-
amine empirical accounts related to the sense of
self-as-subject. There are currently many neur-
oscience programs devoted to self-consciousness,
and recently some researchers claim to have ex-
plained the neural mechanisms of the sense of
self-as-subject. Investigating these programs will
reveal how philosophy can contribute to neuros-
cience  in  understanding  this  target  phe-
nomenon.
I discuss the sense of body ownership in
section 2, and explain how it helps to clarify the
sense of self-as-object. Section  3 introduces the
notion of experiential ownership. I use this no-
tion to specify what it is like to experience the
self-as-subject. A crucial claim is that being the
subject of an experience does not imply experi-
encing oneself  as the subject of experience. If
this is correct, at least some forms of IEM fail.
Consequently, if we want to talk about a sense
of self-as-subject we need more empirical stud-
ies.  Section  4 examines  Damasio’s  account  of
the  core-self  and  Panksepp’s  affective  neuros-
cience. Both claim to explain the neural basis of
the  sense  of  self-as-subject,  but  I  argue  that
they only address the sense of self-as-object. In
section  5,  I  criticize  two proposals  that  some
neuroscientists  use for explaining the sense of
self-as-subject:  neural  synchrony  and  subcor-
tical-cortical  midline  structures  (SCMS).  The
overall positive lesson we can take from these
accounts will be presented in the final section.
2 Body ownership and self-as-object
The sense of body ownership concerns whether
a body part or a whole body is experienced as
belonging to me. For example, I am now typing
this paper with two hands, and I have a sense
that  the  two hands  are  mine.  To clarify  this
concept of self-experience, three distinctions will
be very useful. One is between the fact of body
ownership  and  the  sense of  body  ownership
(Dokic 2003; de Vignemont 2011). The former is
a  biological  fact  about  the  anatomical  struc-
tures of one’s body. The latter is a conscious ex-
perience of the fact of body ownership. As the
syndrome of somatoparaphrenia indicates, these
two aspects are dissociable. A prominent feature
of somatoparaphrenia is that patients deny that
parts  of  their  body,  e.g.,  a  hand,  belongs  to
them (Vallar &  Ronchi 2009).  Their  sense  of
body ownership fails to match up with the facts
—namely, that that the hand is theirs. 
In  healthy  subjects,  the  sense  of  body
ownership can also be mistaken. In the rubber
hand illusion (RHI),  participants experience a
fake hand as belonging to them. The set-up is
simple: The subject’s own hand is blocked from
view. The subject sees a rubber hand in front of
her,  clearly  distinct  from her  own real  hand.
The experimenter uses paint brushes to touch
the real hand and the rubber hand either syn-
chronously or asynchronously (Botvinick & Co-
hen 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard 2005). In the syn-
chronous condition, many subjects report that
they feel as though they are being touched on
the rubber hand rather than on their real hand.
More interestingly, many subjects feel as if the
rubber hand were their own hand.2 
Another form of misrepresentation involves
the full body—an illusion that induces some in-
teresting  aspects  of  out-of-body  experience
2 Proprioceptive  drift  is  another  aspect  frequently  associated  with
RHI: many subjects judge (by proprioception) their real hand as be-
ing located closer to the rubber hand, rather than as where it really
is. But Rohde et al. (2011) have recently shown that this aspect can
be dissociated from the feeling of the rubber hand as one’s own. 
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(OBE) (Lenggenhager et al. 2007).3 In experi-
ments of this type, the subject wears a three-di-
mensional head-mounted display (HMD), and a
stereo  camera  stands  two  meters  behind  her.
The scenes registered by the camera are trans-
mitted to the HMD such that the subject sees
the  back of  his  virtual  body in  front  of  her.
Then the subject’s back is stroked either syn-
chronously or  asynchronously with the virtual
body. In the synchronous condition, many sub-
jects feel as if the virtual body were their own.4
The  second  distinction  is  between  the
first-personal sense and third-personal sense of
body ownership. In daily experience, the sense
of body ownership is often first-personal as well
as pre-reflective (Legrand 2007,  2010). That is,
by  proprioception  and somatosensation,  I  can
experience  the  body  as  mine  from the  inside
without  watching  it  or  reflecting  upon  it  (de
Vignemont 2012).  Consider  simple  activities
such as walking. When I talk to someone while
walking, my attention can be fully absorbed in
the conversation. In this case, I don’t pay any
attention to my leg movements. Still, due to the
firing patterns of muscle spindles in my legs, I
implicitly experience that my legs take turns en-
tering  into  the  stance  phase  (touching  the
ground)  and  the  swing  phase  (leaving  the
ground) to move my body forward. In contrast,
the sense of body ownership can sometimes be
third-personal and reflective. When looking at a
3 Cf. Ehrsson (2007) for a different OBE experiment.
4 The relationship between body-part and whole-body representations
for body ownership is a controversial issue. Clearly they are not the
same. The issue is: are they fundamentally different? Or is the differ-
ence only a matter of degree? As an anonymous reviewer points out,
during the rubber-hand illusion, one’s self-location and global body
ownership are unaffected. However, during full-body illusions these
aspects  are  affected and misrepresented because  they concern the
whole-body. Some researchers might therefore think that there exist
some  fundamental  differences  between  body-part  and  whole-body
representations for body ownership. One can also reasonably hypo-
thesize  that  the neural  mechanisms that  are  responsible  for hand
ownership do not need to involve brain regions that process leg or
trunk representations. However, in my opinion more interdisciplinary
studies would be required to really solve this issue. My current posi-
tion is that, regarding the sense of body ownership, the difference
between body-part and whole-body representations is a matter of de-
gree. First, conceptually speaking, there doesn’t seem to be a sharp
distinction  between  body-part  and  whole-body  representations.
Second, if we consider the experimental set-ups of the rubber hand
illusion and of the full-body illusions (either Lenggenhager’s version
or Ehrsson’s), the differences between them seem to be a matter of
degree as well. Of course, these are not arguments yet. I have re-
cently designed a set of experiments precisely to deal with this issue,
and I hope to be able to say something about it soon.
monitor in an airport showing the image of my
body, I may wonder whether the body that I
see is mine. In this case, instead of experiencing
it from the inside, I consider my body from the
third-person point of view. That is, the body is
treated as the object of visual experience, atten-
tion, or reflection.5 In the rest of this paper, I
will use “the sense of body ownership” to indic-
ate the first-personal sense of the term.6
These two distinctions have been sugges-
ted before. But now I want to propose a third
distinction  to  help  elucidate  what  we  mean
when we talk about the sense of self-as-object.
This  third  distinction  refers  to  the  difference
between a sense of body ownership and a sense
of self as a physical body.7 The former relates to
questions like “Is this my hand?” and “Is that
body mine?”, whereas the latter concerns issues
such as “What am I?” and “Am I a physical ob-
ject?”  This  distinction  marks  two  notions  of
bodily  self-consciousness:  experiencing  a  body
part or a full  body as one’s  own,  on the one
hand, and being conscious of oneself as a phys-
ical body on the other. Conceptually, the sense
of having a body and the sense of being a body
are different notions.8 However, they are closely
related  experientially.  I  suggest  that experien-
5 Are there borderline cases between the first-personal and the third-
personal experiences of one’s own body? I think so. For example, to
use the above example again, if one of my legs suddenly hurts a little
bit, I may be able to continue my conversation without disruption,
but I have to pay attention to proprioception in order to walk nor-
mally. In this case, I submit, the distinction between the first-per-
sonal and the third-personal senses of body ownership is not sharp.
However, this will not affect my proposal below regarding the rela-
tionship between the sense of full-body ownership and the sense of
self-as-object.
6 Both the first-personal and the third-personal senses of body owner-
ship are involved in RHI and OBE. On the one hand, the fake hand
or  the  virtual  body that  the  subject  sees  is  the  object  of  visual
awareness, which is experienced as standing apart from their visual
perspective. In addition, by filling in the questionnaires after the ex-
periment, the subject makes explicit judgments about body owner-
ship.  This  is  the  third-personal  sense  of body ownership.  On the
other  hand,  during  the  experiment,  the  synchronous  touch  and
proprioception causes the subject to feel as if “it is my body that is
being touched”. This is the first-personal sense of body ownership,
which  can  be  indirectly  measured  by  skin  conductance  response
(SCR). In RHI and OBE, both the third-personal and the first-per-
sonal senses of body ownership are prone to misrepresentation.
7 Here, “physical body” is broadly construed such that it can refer not
only to a physical object but also to a biological organism or a flesh-
and-blood person.
8 A Cartesian dualist might say that, although I experience a particu-
lar body as mine, I fundamentally conceive of myself  as a thinking
being rather than as a physical body. For the purpose of this paper,
we can set Cartesianism aside.
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cing ownership of a full body provides a sense of
self as a physical body. When I engage in daily
activities,  there  is  not  only  a  sense  that  this
body is mine but also a sense that I am a phys-
ical  body.  Consider  ordinary  experiences  like
eating,  running,  bleeding,  standing  behind  a
desk, etc. These experiences involve a sense of
body ownership, i.e. what it is like to  have  a
body. But I also experience what it is like to be
something that is eating, running, bleeding, etc.
That is, I have a sense about  what I am, or a
sense of myself as a physical body that is doing
these things. 
I suggest that the sense of full-body own-
ership helps us to understand the sense of self-
as-physical-body.9 The sense of self-as-physical-
body, in turn, helps us to specify what it means
to be conscious of the self-as-object.10 When I
experience these hands as mine, there is a sense
in which I am implicitly aware of myself  as a
physical  body such that  these two hands  are
parts of me. The proposal here is that I am con-
scious of myself-as-object when I am conscious
of  myself  as  a  physical  body.  This  holds  not
only in cases where I take myself as an object of
vision or attention, such as seeing myself in a
mirror. It holds even when I experience myself
as a body from the first person perspective.11 
9 The idea is that we know how to conduct empirical research in order
to study the sense of full-body ownership which, as Blanke and Met-
zinger suggest, is connected with the following features: (i) the global
sense of identification with a physical body as a whole (self-identific-
ation); (ii) the sense of being situated in a specific place (self-loca-
tion); and (iii) the sense of possessing “a point of projection func-
tioning as its origin in sensory and mental processing (weak 1PP)”
(2009, pp. 7–8). Together, these features characterize what Blanke
and Metzinger call minimal phenomenal selfhood (MPS), defined as
“the conscious experience of being a self” (2009, p. 7). It is my view
that these three features articulate what it is like to be a self  as a
physical body. In this regard, the sense of full-body ownership helps
us to understand the sense of self-as-physical-body. Also, thanks to
the recent findings of the RHI and the OBE experiments, we have
now better ideas regarding how misrepresentation may occur in the
sense of body ownership. This, in turn, suggests that the sense of
self-as-physical-body can involve misrepresentation as well.
10 In my account, “the sense of self-as-physical-body” serves as a con-
ceptual bridge between “the sense of full-body ownership” and the
“sense of self-as-object”. Experientially, the sense of full-body owner-
ship and the sense of self-as-physical-body are closely related. I de-
liberately leave open whether these two notions denote the same or
different experiences. I think more interdisciplinary work will be re-
quired to fix this issue.
11 My proposal here is very different from what might be called the
Pre-reflective  Account  of  self-consciousness  (Legrand 2006,  2007,
2010, 2011; Gallagher 2005; Zahavi 2005). According to this account,
self and body are constitutively tied together, and body can provide
a sense of self-as-subject, i.e., one can experience one’s body-as-sub-
Let me draw some remarks made by Wit-
tgenstein to support this proposal. Consider his
examples of “I”-as-object: “My arm is broken”,
“I have grown six inches”, “I have a bump on
my  forehead”  (1958,  p.  67).  These  examples
clearly refer to the speaker’s body. This fits my
suggestion  that  consciousness  of  self-as-object
can be understood as consciousness  of  self-as-
physical-body—I have  the  sense  that  I  am a
body that has a broken arm or that has grown
six inches. Now consider his examples of “I”-as-
subject:  “I see  so-and-so”,  “I try  to  lift  my
arm”, “I have toothache” (1958, pp. 66–67). As
indicated  by  his  own  italicization,  the  use  of
“I”-as-subject is about who the perceiver, agent,
or  the  subject  is.  But  notice  that  these  ex-
amples  refer  to  the  speaker’s  body  as  well.
What  does  this  tell  us?  My interpretation  is
that it implies that the idea of who the subject
is should not be regarded as the same as the
idea of what does the perceiving, lifting, or un-
dergoes toothache. The sense of self-as-subject
is not equivalent to the sense of self-as-physical-
body. 
Towards the end of  The Blue Book, Wit-
tgenstein makes two important remarks. First,
“we  can  perfectly  well  adopt  the  expression
“this body feels pain”, and we shall then, just
as usual, tell it to go to the doctor, to lie down,
and even to remember that when the last time
it had pains they were over in a day” (1958, p.
73).12 His point is that we should not construe
the thing that suffers pain as a Cartesian imma-
terial ego. The notion of body in the expression
ject. Pre-reflectively experiencing the self as a physical body would
correspond to  the  sense  of  body-as-subject  rather  than  as-object.
The difference between my view and this account centers on whether
the notion of  object  in  “self-as-object” is  construed as  a physical
body or as an “intentional object of consciousness”. I contend that
the sense of self-as-subject is different from the sense of body-as-sub-
ject. Experiencing the self as the subject of experiences is not the
same as experiencing the self as a perceiving or acting body. I ad-
dress these issues in another paper. 
12 Just before this, Wittgenstein says: “Let us now ask: ‘Can a human
body have pain?’ One is inclined to say: ‘How can the body have
pain? The body in itself is something dead; a body isn’t conscious!’
And here again it is as though we looked into the nature of pain and
saw that it lies in its nature that a material object can’t have it. And
it is as though we saw that what has pain must be an entity of a dif-
ferent nature from that of a material object; that, in fact, it must be
of a mental nature. But to say that the ego is mental is like saying
that the number 3 is of a mental or an immaterial nature, when we
recognize that the numeral ‘3’ isn’t used as a sign for a physical ob-
ject” (1958, p.73).
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‘this body feels pain’ can perfectly well refer to
a physical object, i.e. to a person or to a biolo-
gical  organism that  can consciously  feel  pain.
Wittgenstein states this point from the third-
person perspective. But there is no reason why
this point cannot be formulated from the first-
person perspective.  That is,  by “this  body” I
can refer to myself. As I suggested above, I can
experience my body  from the inside.  Someone
else can tell me to go to the doctor or to lie
down, etc. In this case, I can be aware of myself
as  having a  body that  is  in  pain (a sense  of
body ownership), and I can have a sense of my-
self as a body that is in pain (the sense of self-
as-physical-body). 
This  brings us to Wittgenstein’s second
remark:  “The  kernel  of  our  proposition  that
that which has pains or sees or thinks is of a
mental nature is only that the word ‘I’ in ‘I
have pains’ does not denote a particular body,
for we can’t substitute for ‘I’ a description of
a body” (1958, pp. 73–74). My interpretation
of  this  remark  is  that,  even  when  it  is  my
body that is  in pain, there remains a differ-
ence between saying “I have pains” and saying
“this particular body feels pain”. When Wit-
tgenstein  says  that  “the  word  ‘I’  in  ‘I  have
pains’  does  not  denote  a  particular  body”,
this remark can apply to the speaker’s body
considered from  the  first-person  perspective.
The reason why we can’t substitute for “I” a
description of a body is not because my body
has  to  be  described  from  the  third-person
point of view or that it has to be treated as
an intentional object of consciousness. Rather,
the reason we can’t  substitute  for  “I”  a  de-
scription of a body is that the “I” in “I have
pains” captures the sense of  who feels pains,
while “a particular body” captures the sense
of  what feels  pains.  This  difference,  then,
marks  two  different  types  of  self-conscious-
ness.  In  the  former  case,  I  am conscious  of
myself  as  the  subject  of  pain  experience.  In
the latter  case,  I  am conscious  of  myself  as
the body that feels pain. I do not mean that
this is the only possible interpretation of Wit-
tgenstein’s remarks. My claim is that it is  a
plausible  interpretation,  according  to  which
the  sense  of  self  as  subject  of  experience  is
distinct  from the  sense  of  self  as  a  physical
body,  even  when  the  body  is  characterized
from the first-person perspective. 
So far I have suggested an empirical ap-
proach to understanding the sense of self-as-ob-
ject. The sense of full-body ownership provides
theoretical and experiential grounds for under-
standing  the  sense  of  self-as-physical-body,
which, in turn, helps to explicate the sense of
self-as-object.  This  means that  we can under-
stand consciousness of self-as-object by studying
the sense of full-body ownership. This fits Wit-
tgenstein’s and Shoemaker’s assertions that the
“I”-as  object  allows  misrepresentation.  The
main advantage of my approach, however, lies
in the fact that we know how to conduct empir-
ical research on the sense of self-as-object. Now,
in cognitive neuroscience there are plenty of ex-
citing  studies  on  full-body  illusions  and  their
neural mechanisms (Lenggenhager et al. 2007;
Petkova & Ehrsson 2008; Ehrsson 2007; Ehrsson
2012;  Ionta et al. 2011;  Blanke 2012;  Serino et
al. 2013). A philosophical account will certainly
benefit from looking at these. But what about
the sense of self-as-subject? In the next section,
I will appeal to the notion of experiential own-
ership  in  order  to  capture  this  basic  form of
self-consciousness.
3 Experiential ownership and self-as-
subject
The sense of experiential ownership is not about
ownership of body parts or a whole body, but
about whether I represent myself as the unique
subject of experience. As I am typing, for ex-
ample, I  do not only experience tactile sensa-
tions in my fingers. I also have a sense that I
am the one who is having these tactile sensa-
tions. This corresponds to Wittgenstein’s asser-
tion: “To ask ‘are you sure it is you who have
pains?’ would be nonsensical.” In this section, I
will (1) illustrate that the sense of experiential
ownership is  different from the sense of  body
ownership; and (2) draw two distinctions to ex-
plicate  the  sense  of  experiential  ownership.  I
will then (3) describe some varieties of the im-
munity  principle  (IEM);  and  (4)  provide  two
counterexamples  against  two  major  forms  of
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IEM. We will see that,  pace Wittgenstein and
Shoemaker, we need another way of articulating
the distinction between the sense of self-as-ob-
ject and the sense of self-as-subject.
Moro et al. (2004) describe two patients
with  somatoparaphrenia.  These  patients
suffered not only from somatoparaphrenia but
also from hemispatial neglect and tactile extinc-
tion. They denied ownership of their left hand,
in which they had no sensation, and their left
visual field was lost. So far, we might think that
these  cases  involve  only  misrepresentation  of
body ownership. But there is more. When the
researcher moved the patients’ left hand to the
right-hand side so that they could see it, their
tactile sensation was restored. But despite rep-
resenting  themselves  as  the  subjects  who  felt
the sensations, the two patients still denied the
ownership of their left hands (2004, p. 440–441).
This shows that it is possible to have the sense
of experiential ownership without the sense of
body ownership. The two types of self-experi-
ence  are  conceptually  and empirically  dissoci-
able. 
To clarify the notion of experiential owner-
ship,  let  me begin  with  the  point  that  every
phenomenal state has a  what-component and a
who-component.  The  what-component  includes
the representational  content  and the phenom-
enal character of that state. The  who-compon-
ent ties the  what-component to a unique sub-
ject.  The basic  assumption here is  that  every
phenomenal state has one and only one subject.
The sense  of  experiential  ownership is  exclus-
ively  about  the who-component—it  concerns
whether one experiences oneself as the subject
of a phenomenal state. I will now draw two dis-
tinctions to further clarify this point. 
The first distinction is between the fact of
experiential ownership and the sense of experi-
ential ownership. When a subject experiences a
phenomenal state, there exists a fact that he is
the subject of that state. This fact of experien-
tial ownership is constitutive of every conscious
experience—i.e. every experience has a unique
subject. For every conscious experience, we can
ask “Who is  the subject  of  that  experience?”
and there exists a fact of the matter. For ex-
ample, right now it is me, not you, who is ex-
periencing lower-back pain. The fact of experi-
ential ownership is objective in that it refers to
a biological fact about whether a subject under-
goes a phenomenal state.
When a subject experiences herself  as the
unique subject of a phenomenal state, she has
the sense of experiential ownership, i.e. she ex-
periences  herself  as  the subject  of  that  state.
This  aspect  is  captured  by  the  Wittgenstein
Question:  “Are  you  sure  it  is  you  who has
pains?” When a subject answers this question,
she relies on her sense of experiential ownership.
When I  have a tactile  sensation,  I  experience
what it is like for me to undergo that sensation.
The  what-it-is-like  aspect, i.e., the phenomenal
character, belongs to the  what-component. The
for-me aspect refers to the subjective sense that
I am the one who is having the sensation.13 
The fact of experiential ownership and the
sense of experiential ownership are two different
aspects of experiential ownership: the factual as-
pect and the  subjective aspect.  These are not
numerically different states or events that can
be detached from a phenomenal state. Rather,
they are  two ways of  characterizing  the  who-
component of that state. The factual aspect ad-
dresses  whether  a  subject  experiences  a  phe-
nomenal  state;  the  subjective  aspect  concerns
whether the subject is conscious of the factual
aspect. But many philosophers do not see that
these two aspects are not the same. To sustain
this distinction, I will later argue that the fac-
tual  aspect  of  experiential  ownership  can  be
misrepresented,  which  means  that  sometimes
the Wittgenstein Question can be perfectly in-
telligible. Misrepresentation, as I shall explain,
happens  when  the  subjective  aspect  fails  to
match the factual aspect of experiential owner-
ship.
The  second  distinction  is  between  the
first-personal sense and third-personal sense of
experiential ownership. Suppose I experience a
phenomenal  state—say,  lower-back  pain.  Not
only do I experience the phenomenal character
of the pain but also,  in the very same experi-
ence, I have the sense that it is  me who is ex-
periencing  that  particular  pain.  This  sense  of
13 For other views about the for-me aspect, cf. Kriegel (2009) and Le-
grand (2007).
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experiential ownership is first-personal, since it
is part of the pain experience rather than res-
ulting from a separate act of reflection. I experi-
ence a sense of experiential ownership by exper-
iencing the pain without requiring any further
attention or introspection. 
Now suppose  I  participate  in  an  experi-
ment where several subjects receive tactile stim-
ulations in a random order and everyone is sim-
ultaneously  scanned  with  fMRI  equipment.14
Later,  using  the  fMRI  data  on  my  somato-
sensory cortex, I can judge whether it was me
who experienced a particular stimulation a few
minutes ago. In this case, the sense of experien-
tial ownership is considered from the third-per-
son point of view, where the sense of experien-
tial ownership is the content of a further judg-
ment or reflection rather than an integral part
of the respective phenomenal states. 
I suggest that the sense of self-as-subject
is captured by the first-personal sense of experi-
ential ownership. Being conscious of oneself-as-
subject just is to experience oneself as the sub-
ject  of  a phenomenal  state.  This  implies  that
the sense of self-as-subject is exclusively about
the who-component of a phenomenal state—no
parts of the  what-component belong to it. The
sense of self-as-subject concerns whether I ex-
perience myself as the subject of a phenomenal
state and nothing else. For the rest of this pa-
per, I will use the term “the sense of experien-
tial  ownership”  strictly  in  the  first-personal
sense. 
Can one’s sense of self-as-subject go wrong?
Following  Wittgenstein  and  Shoemaker,  most
philosophers believe that the answer to this ques-
tion is negative. According to Shoemaker, “in be-
ing aware that one feels pain one is, tautologic-
ally, aware, not simply that the attribute  feel(s)
pain is instantiated, but that it is instantiated in
oneself”  (1968,  pp.  563–564;  emphases  in  ori-
ginal). Hence, when I consciously feel a sensation,
I  cannot be wrong  about whether it is me who
feels it. This immunity (IEM) is widely considered
to be a conceptual truth.15 
14 The method used here is called hyperscanning; cf.  Montague et al.
(2002). 
15 Also,  when specifying the “I”-as-subject,  Shoemaker remarks  that
“not every self-ascription could be grounded on an identification of a
presented object as oneself” (1968, p. 561). Because identification of
I want to argue, however, that both Shoe-
maker and Wittgenstein are wrong. IEM is not
a  conceptual  truth,  and  sometimes  it  makes
perfect sense to ask the Wittgenstein Question
—namely, “Are you sure it is you who is having
a so-and-so experience?” Using my own terms, I
will argue that the sense of experiential owner-
ship  can  misrepresent  the  fact of  experiential
ownership.  First,  let  me briefly mention some
varieties of IEM. (1) Pryor (1999) distinguishes
between  de re  misidentification and which-ob-
ject misidentification.16 De re misidentification is
false identification of two particular objects. It
occurs when a mental state that a is F involves
an assumption that  a = b, but in fact  a  b≠ .
For  example,  when  looking  in  the  mirror,  I
misidentify someone else as myself (Pryor 1999,
p. 276). A mental state enjoys  de re immunity
just in case it is not possible for the state to be
in error through de re  misidentification. In the
case of which-object misidentification, one makes
an existential generalization that there is some-
thing that is F based on suitable grounds, but
misidentifies  which thing is  F (Pryor 1999,  p.
281).  For  example,  when  listening  to  a  sym-
phony orchestra, I can tell that one of the trum-
pet players is slightly out of tune, but I misid-
entify  which one it  is.  A mental  state  enjoys
which-object immunity just in case it is not pos-
sible for the state to be in error through which-
object  misidentification.  (2)  De Vignemont
(2012)  recently  distinguished  bodily  immunity
from mental  immunity. Mental immunity con-
cerns whether certain self-ascriptions of mental
states, including thoughts, judgments, or sensa-
tions, etc., enjoy IEM. By contrast, bodily im-
munity is  not  about  mental  states  but  about
bodily  properties.  It  concerns  whether  certain
self-ascriptions of bodily states enjoy IEM, e.g.
“my legs are crossed”.17 
the self requires that when ascribing a mental state to oneself, e.g. “a
is F”, one needs to demonstrate both “b is F” and “a = b.” But “b is
F” would in turn require both “c is F” and “b = c”, and hence gen-
erates an infinite regress. This, Shoemaker argues, shows that the
sense of self-as-subject must be identification-free.
16 Although disputed (Coliva 2006), many still consider this distinction
useful.
17 Other varieties of IEM have been proposed in the literature. For ex-
ample,  Shoemaker (1968) distinguishes between circumstantial and
absolute  immunity,  and  between  de  facto and  logical  immunity
(Shoemaker 1970; cf. also  Coliva 2006).  Pryor (1999) distinguishes
between relative and absolute immunity. The former refers to im-
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My target is a form of mental immunity
that  I  call  experiential immunity.  Experiential
immunity concerns phenomenal experiences. It
is a form of relative immunity that is, it is rel― -
ative  to  first-personal  access  to  phenomenal
states,  such  as  introspection,  somatosensation,
proprioception,  etc.  Experiential  immunity  is
then the phenomenon that, when I am aware of
a  phenomenal  state  through first-personal  ac-
cess, I cannot be wrong about whether it is me
who feels it. Experiential immunity can be con-
strued as de re or which-object immunity. In the
following  section,  I  present  counterexamples
against both versions of experiential immunity.
This will show that the sense of self-as-subject
can be erroneous.
Bottini et al. (2002) describe a somatopa-
raphrenia patient  (“FB”) who has  lost  tactile
sensation in her left hand and insists that her
left hand belongs to her niece. They conducted
the  following  tests  on  the  patient,  each  in-
volving  several  trials:  (i)  FB  was  blindfolded
and told by the researcher that her left hand
would be touched. Then the researcher actually
touched the dorsal surface of her left hand. The
result was that FB always reported feeling no
sensation.  (ii)  FB  was  again  blindfolded  and
was  told  that  her  niece’s hand  would  be
touched. The result in this case was that, when
the researcher touched the dorsal surface of her
left hand, surprisingly, FB reported feeling the
touch.18 The relevance of this case to IEM lies in
the fact that, since FB was blindfolded during
these tests, she relied on internal and first-per-
sonal  access  (e.g.,  introspection,  somatosensa-
tion,  proprioception)  to determine  whether  or
not she felt the touch. The perplexity lies in the
difference between tests (i) and (ii). For the re-
searcher,  the  only  difference  between the  two
munity relative to certain rational  grounds G, and the latter im-
munity by every possible ground. Regarding judgments and beliefs,
Coliva (2006) suggests a distinction between immunity relative to the
subject’s own rational grounds and immunity relative to background
presuppositions. 
18 Test (ii) was conducted for four sessions, and FB reported feeling
touches in 70%, 70%, 100%, and 80% of the trials respectively. As
Bottini  et  al.  observe:  “her  tactile  imperceptions  dramatically  re-
covered” (2002, p. 251). To test if FB was just guessing, she was
again blindfolded and told that her right hand (which is normal)
would be touched.  But actually the researcher did not touch her
right hand. The result was that FB never reported feeling sensations
—i.e., she passed the catch trials.
was the verbal cues given to FB before touching
her  hand.  The  remaining  conditions  were  the
same. But for FB, the difference was dramatic.
Why is it that FB felt nothing when she expec-
ted that she herself would be touched, but felt
the sensations when she expected that her niece
would be touched? What is the best description
of this strange phenomenology? 
My view is that, during test (ii), FB mis-
represented her tactile sensations as belonging
to someone else, namely her niece. For the sake
of argument, Shoemaker and I can agree on the
following claims: (1) for every phenomenal state
there must be a subject who experiences it; (2)
every phenomenal state is in principle available
to  first-personal  access  (Shoemaker 1996);  (3)
every phenomenal state is  experienced by the
one who has first-personal access to that state.
The crucial point is that (1)–(3) do not imply
that  (4)  every phenomenal  state  is,  from the
first-person point of view, represented as experi-
enced by the one who has first-personal access
to that state. In FB’s case, (4) fails. FB fails to
represent from her first-person perspective that
she is the owner of the sensations. During test
(ii), the factual aspect of her experiential own-
ership of the tactile sensations was intact when
she was told that her niece would be touched,
i.e., she was indeed the one who felt the tactile
sensations. What went wrong was her sense of
experiential  ownership.  Although  FB  felt  the
sensations, she misrepresented this fact as it be-
ing her niece who felt them.19 This shows that it
is empirically possible for a subject, while being
aware of a phenomenal state via a first-personal
19 Shoemaker describes IEM as follows: ‘The statement ‘I feel pain’ is
not subject to error through misidentification relative to ‘I’: it can-
not happen that I am mistaken in saying ‘I feel pain’ because, al-
though I  do  know of  someone that  feels  pain,  I  am mistaken in
thinking that person to be myself’ (1968, p. 557). Based on this de-
scription, some might insist that the self-ascriptions involved in IEM
must be propositional in form, i.e. judgments, beliefs or statements.
However, I contend that this restriction is unnecessary. What is cru-
cial for IEM is that the self-ascriptions are based on first-personal
grounds such as introspection, somatosensation, and proprioception,
etc. As Bottini et al. have stated: “The patient was blindfolded and
instructed to say ‘yes’ when she felt a touch and ‘no’ when she did
not feel any touch” (2002, p. 251). So when FB said “yes” during
test (ii), there is no reason why this wouldn’t count as a self-ascrip-
tion. Applying Shoemaker’s description to FB’s case: I am mistaken
in reporting ‘yes’  during test (ii) because,  although I do know of
someone that feels the sensations (via first-personal access), I am
mistaken in my thinking about who that person is. Shoemaker’s IEM
can be violated. 
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method, to commit a de re error regarding who
the subject of that state is. Hence,  de re im-
munity fails. Using my own terms, the sense of
experiential ownership can misrepresent the fact
of experiential ownership.20
The second case against Shoemaker’s IEM
is the “body swap illusion” (Petkova & Ehrsson
2008,  figure 6).  This  involves agentive experi-
ence—I  experience  myself  as  someone  who  is
doing  something.  In  an  experiment,  subjects
wore  a  head-mounted  display  (HMD),  and
stood face-to-face  with the experimenter,  who
wore two closed-circuit television (CCTV) cam-
eras. The images registered by the CCTV cam-
eras were transmitted concurrently to the sub-
jects’  HMD, such that through the HMD the
subjects saw their own body facing themselves.
Both the subjects and the experimenter exten-
ded  their  right  hands,  took  hold,  and  then
squeezed  synchronously  for  two  minutes.
Twenty college students participated in this ex-
periment. The authors describe their phenomen-
ology: “after the experiment, several of the par-
ticipants spontaneously remarked: ‘I was shak-
ing hands with myself!’” (2008, p. 5)
This strange phenomenology indicates that
the subjects’ agentive experience was mistaken.
It was the experimenter who was shaking their
hands,  not  the  subjects  themselves.  Again,
Shoemaker and I can agree that: (1) for every
agentive  experience  there  must  be  a  subject
who experiences it;  (2)  every agentive  experi-
ence is in principle available to first-personal ac-
cess; and (3) every agentive experience is exper-
ienced by the subject who has first-personal ac-
cess to it. However, (1)–(3) together do not im-
ply that: (4) every agentive experience is, from
the first-person perspective,  represented as ex-
perienced by the subject who in fact has first-
personal access to it. In this case,  which-object
immunity  fails  because  (4)  was  violated  by
20 One might object that the mistake that FB made was about the judg-
ment of experiential ownership, not the sense of experiential ownership.
My reply is that since FB was blindfolded, her report was based on first-
personal grounds, i.e. on introspection. In addition, FB passed the catch
trials mentioned in. As Bottini et al. have stated, FB “did not show any
other sign of mental deterioration on the Mini Mental State Examina-
tion” (2002, p. 251). Therefore, no evidence suggests that her reports
were unreliable. These considerations support the idea that the mistake
was FB’s sense of experiential ownership rather than her judgment. For
other objections and responses, cf. Lane & Liang (2011).
those who experienced the strange phenomeno-
logy in the body swap illusion. They were aware
that there was someone having the agentive ex-
perience of squeezing their hands, but they mis-
represented  themselves  as  the  subject  of  that
experience.21 
As such, it is possible for the subject of a
given conscious experience, while being aware of
that experience via a first-personal standpoint,
to be mistaken about who the subject is.22 Thus
Wittgenstein  is  wrong:  it  would  make perfect
sense to ask FB and the body-swap subjects:
‘Are you sure that it is you who is having a so-
and-so  experience?’  And Shoemaker  is  wrong,
too: experiential  immunity is  violated both in
FB’s case and in the body-swap illusion. One’s
sense self-as-subject can be mistaken—that is,
the sense of experiential ownership can misrep-
resent the fact of experiential ownership. There-
fore, since both the sense of self-as-object and
the sense of self-as-subject can involve misrep-
resentation,  Shoemaker’s  IEM  fails  to  distin-
guish between them.23 
21 Again, one might wonder whether the misrepresentation in this case
was about the judgment rather than about the sense of experiential
ownership. My reply is that since the subjects were normal college
students, their reportability was not in question. So it is plausible to
assume that their reports that “I was shaking hands with myself”
were based on their subjective phenomenology, and more specifically
on their sense of experiential ownership. Hence it was their sense of
experiential ownership that committed misrepresentation.
22 There are at least two other (possible) cases of misrepresentation of
the sense of experiential ownership. One is voice ownership: an illu-
sion in which a stranger’s voice, when presented as the auditory con-
comitant of a participant’s own speech, is perceived as a modified
version of one’s own voice. “It felt as if the voice I heard was my
voice”  (Zeng et  al. 2011).  The  other  is  perception  ownership:  A
twenty-three-year-old  male  (DP)  suffered  from right  inferior  tem-
poral hypometabolism (Zahn et al. 2008). The authors of a study on
this male described his sensations as follows: “It appeared to him
that he was able to see everything normally, but that he did not im-
mediately recognize that he was the one who perceives and that he
needed a second step to become aware that he himself was the one
who perceives the object.”
23 Let me briefly compare my position with other views. First, following
Shoemaker, Coliva (2000) states that “If a subject is introspectively
aware of pain, this just means that she is feeling pain […] it is a mat-
ter of conceptual truth that if a subject is introspectively aware of a
certain mental state, then she herself is having it and, therefore, that
mental state is her own” (my emphasis). In contrast to Coliva, my
account rejects IEM as a conceptual truth. From the fact that a sub-
ject experiences a mental state it does not necessarily follow that the
subject represents herself as the one who experiences that state. I
take the possibility of misrepresentation to be an important feature
of the sense of experiential ownership.
Second, Legrand (2007) emphasizes that consciousness of self-as-sub-
ject is pre-reflective, meaning that it is not an object of intentional
consciousness.  She says  that the self-as-subject “is  neither an ex-
ternal object (for example, it is not my body that I can observe in
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I  propose  that  this  distinction  can  be
made clearer by looking again at the sense of
body  ownership  and the  sense  of  experiential
ownership. As I  suggested in the last  section,
the sense of self-as-object can be understood in
terms of a sense of self-as-physical-body which,
in turn, can be understood via a sense of full-
body ownership. Hence, when one experiences
full-body ownership, one is conscious of oneself-
as-object. In this section, I have suggested that
we take an empirical approach to understanding
the sense of self-as-subject. We can understand
the consciousness of self-as-subject by studying
the  sense  of  experiential  ownership.24 In  the
the mirror) nor an internal object […] I am simply looking outside at
the external world, and within this single act of consciousness I pre-
reflectively  experience  myself-as-subject”  (2007).  I  agree  that  the
sense of self-as-subject is often implicit rather than explicit. But Le-
grand’s view neglects the distinction that I draw between the fact
and the sense of experiential ownership. This is indicated by the fact
of her embracing IEM. The fact of experiential ownership can be se-
cured simply by looking outside at the external world, but whether
one’s sense of experiential ownership is correct is another issue.
24 What is the relationship between the sense of body ownership and
the sense of experiential ownership? The short answer is that the
former presupposes the latter, but a full treatment would require an-
other paper. Here, let me draw on Metzinger’s Self-model Theory of
Subjectivity (2003,  2008) to briefly address this issue. According to
this theory, PMIR (phenomenal model of the intentionality relation)
is a phenomenal experience that represents the relation between a
subject and an object component. For example, I take a bite of an
apple. The PMIR contains a subject component (I), a relation com-
ponent (tasting), and an object component (the apple). But I want
to propose a revised version of PMIR. Since the PMIR is a complex
phenomenal property experienced by a subject, it would sometimes
be legitimate to ask who is experiencing this particular PMIR. Does
the  subject  attribute  the  sense  of  experiential  ownership  of  this
PMIR to him or herself? My proposal is that PMIR consists of three
components: (1) the sense of experiential ownership; (2) intentional
relations; and (3) an object component. On this view, PMIR already
involves the sense of experiential ownership as the subject compon-
ent, which is distinct from intentional relations and the object com-
ponent.  This  revised  version  of  PMIR helps  to  unpack  the  phe-
nomenological structures of the sense of body ownership as follows.
The subject component is served by the sense of experiential owner-
ship. The object component can be one of the following: my hand, a
rubber hand, someone else’s leg, my whole-body, or a virtual body,
etc. The intentional relations include vision, touch, proprioception,
location, motion, introspective awareness, affective feelings, and so
on. Four quick remarks are relevant here. First, the sense of body
ownership is itself a phenomenal state, about which (2) and (3) spe-
cify the  what-component. The  who-component of the sense of body
ownership is characterized by (1) the sense of experiential ownership.
Hence, the sense of body ownership presupposes the sense of experi-
ential ownership. Second, it is (1) and (2) that generate the sense
that (3) is part of my body. Third, the difference between the sense
of body-part ownership and the sense of full-body ownership lies in
(3), while (1) and (2) may remain the same. Finally, based on my
proposal in section 1, the sense of self-as-physical-body can be under-
stood in terms of the following structure of PMIR: (1) the sense of
experiential  ownership;  (2)  intentional  relations;  and  (3)  a  whole
body. And the sense of self-as-object can be understood in terms of
the same structure of PMIR as well.
next two sections, I examine some of the most
relevant empirical accounts about the sense of
self-as-subject.  I  argue that none of  them are
satisfactory. The reasons for this will be valu-
able when we consider where to go from here.
4 Core-self and affective-self
For  animals,  many  biological  values,  such  as
finding  food  and  shelter,  avoiding  predators,
etc., have to do homeostasis namely maintain― -
ing overall physiological states within the range
required  for  survival  (Damasio 1999,  2010;
Panksepp 1998,  2005).  To  explain  this,  both
Damasio and Panksepp propose that the brain
has distinctive emotion systems and self-systems
(the  “proto-self”  and  the  “core-self”).  These
inter-connected systems regulate homeostasis by
integrating  external  information  from  percep-
tion with internal information from the body.25
Despite  their  differences,  Damasio  and  Pank-
sepp  share  the  following  views:  (1)  emotions
and homeostasis play essential roles in explain-
ing how the  sense  of  self  is  generated in  the
brain; (2) the key brain areas related to the self
involve  not  only  cortical  but  also  sub-cortical
regions, especially the brain stem possessed by
both humans and many animals; (3) those brain
areas are crucial, because multifarious types of
neural  information are  integrated in  those re-
gions and provide representations of the whole
body; (4) both Damasio and Panksepp believe
that their accounts explain not only the sense of
self-as-object but also the sense of self-as-sub-
ject.  In  the following I  elucidate  these  points
and  then  examine  whether  their  goals  are
achieved.
According to Damasio, animal brains have
what he calls the proto-self system, which is “a
dynamic  collection  of  integrated  neural  pro-
cesses, centered on the representation of the liv-
ing body” (2010, p. 9). The neural processes of
25 Both Damasio and Panksepp distinguish between emotions and their
neural substrates, on the one hand, and feelings (Damasio) or affect-
ive feelings (Panksepp), on the other. Emotions refer to innate pat-
terns of neural and physiological responses to environmental events.
Feelings (or affective feelings) refer to phenomenal consciousness of
emotions (Damasio 1999, p. 42, p. 55;  Damasio 2010, pp. 108–110;
Panksepp 1998, pp. 48–49; Panksepp 2005, p. 32). The emotion-sys-
tems closely interact with the self-systems to regulate and manage
homeostasis.
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this system represent “moment by moment, the
most stable aspects of the organism’s physical
structure”, on the one hand, and “the externally
directed sensory portals”, on the other (2010, p.
190).  This  generates  primordial  feelings that
“reflect  the  current  state  of  the  body”  and
“provide a direct experience of one’s own living
body,  wordless,  unadorned,  and  connected  to
nothing  but  sheer  existence”  (2010,  p.  21,  p.
185). The proto-self system and primordial feel-
ings account only for the sense of self-as-object
(2010, p. 9, p. 202). The sense of self-as-subject
is generated when an animal interacts with the
environment such that a neural representation
of  the  interaction  is  generated  in  the  brain
(2010, pp. 9–10, p. 91, p. 202). By interacting
with external objects, the current state of the
body  and  the  proto-self  system are  modified.
This modification activates the core-self system,
which  enhances  attention  to  external  objects
and “engenders a sense of ownership” (2010, pp.
202–203). This is closely related to the sense of
experiential  ownership  discussed  above.  It  is
part of what Damasio calls  core consciousness,
which “displays […]  moment by moment, that
you rather than anyone else are doing the read-
ing and the understanding of the text” (1999, p.
10). 
Damasio’s key idea is that the brain pro-
duces not only first-order representations of ex-
ternal objects and of the body (2010, p. 76, p.
84, pp. 91–97), but also second-order represent-
ations  of the relationship between objects and
the organism (1999, pp. 169–170; 2010, pp. 71–
72, p. 181). These are “the source of the sense
of the self in the act of knowing” (1999, p. 169).
When  the  core-self  is felt (1999,  p.  172),  i.e.
when the second-order  representations become
conscious states (2010, p. 248), core conscious-
ness emerges. This includes a minimal sense of
self-as-subject, a transient sense that “it is you
[…] doing the seeing” (1999, p. 169; cf. 2010, p.
168), or the sense that I am the subject of cur-
rent  experiences  (cf.  2010,  p.  185,  p.  203,  p.
209). As we can see, this account is highly relev-
ant to our current investigation.
Damasio emphasizes that the most crucial
neural structures related to the proto-self  and
the core-self  systems are found in the subcor-
tical regions, especially the brain stem (2010, p.
195, p. 205).26 They include, among others, the
nucleus  tractus solitarius (NTS),  the parabra-
chial  nucleus  (PBN),  the  periaqueductal  gray
(PAG), the hypothalamus, and the superior col-
liculus (2010, pp. 98–99, pp. 191–192; 1999, pp.
180–183).  Why are  these  neural  structures  so
critical for the core-self and core consciousness?
According to Damasio, core consciousness res-
ults from  integration of interoceptive, proprio-
ceptive,  and  exteroceptive  information,  which
produces second-order representations (2010, p.
76, p. 97, pp. 190–196, p. 199, p. 203, pp. 206–
209). The brain areas just mentioned receive in-
put from many other regions, which process in-
formation  about  external  objects  and internal
bodily conditions (2010, p. 78, p. 80, pp. 84–85,
p. 94, pp. 99–100, pp. 207–209). Thus it is in
these areas that integration is thought to take
place. Integration in those areas constitutes core
consciousness because they provide neural rep-
resentations of the organism’s whole body (2010,
p. 68, pp. 94–97, p. 209, pp. 244–245), and the
integration is implemented by neural synchrony
in the gamma range (2010, p. 20, pp. 86–87). 
Panksepp  points  out  seven  basic  innate
emotion-systems  in  mammals:  seeking,  rage,
fear,  lust,  care,  panic,  and play.27 These emo-
tion-systems  generate  affective  feelings,  which
characterize  how  animals  respond  to  environ-
mental challenges.  Panksepp & Northoff (2009)
also postulate that the proto- and core-self sys-
tems  monitor  and  regulate  homeostasis.  The
proto-self is ‘the most ancient form of coherent
body representation’, and the core-self gives rise
to “affective consciousness”.28 Both systems are
26 For Damasio, the cortical areas that are important for the core self
include insular and somatosensory cortices (2010, pp. 205–209).
27 According to Panksepp, emotions and affective feelings are internally
generated  by  neuronal  mechanisms  to  respond  to  life-challenging
events. The neural systems of emotions compute and monitor homeo-
stasis by evaluating an organism’s adaptation to the environment.
Each emotion system refers to a specific neural network, mainly in
the subcortical areas.
28 Panksepp and Northoff prefer to use the expressions “proto-SELF”
and “core-SELF” to emphasize neural mechanisms rather than men-
tal phenomena, but this emphasis need not concern us here. They
describe the relation between core-SELF and affective consciousness
as follows: “What is subjectively experienced here is the relation of
one’s body to the incentives in the environment as well as internally
generated emotional  arousals—the core-SELF thus enables the or-
ganism to access this relation in terms of subjective experience, e.g.,
a primitive form of phenomenal consciousness, which at this level is
essentially affective” (2009, p. 196).
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causally  mediated  by what  they call  affective
self-related processing,  which integrates  intero-
ceptive information from the body and extero-
ceptive stimuli from the environment. The main
mechanism that  underlies  this  processing  is  a
subcortical-cortical  midline  system  (SCMS)
(2009, p. 197). The subcortical parts of this net-
work include “the Periaqueductal gray (PAG),
the  superior  colliculi  (SC),  and  the  adjacent
mesencephalic locomotor region (MLR), as well
as preoptic areas, the hypothalamus, and dorso-
medial thalamus (DMT)” (2009, p. 201). On the
superior  colliculi  (SC) and the periaqueductal
gray (PAG), they tell us that:
The colliculi and the PAG are among the
most richly connected areas of the brain;
both receive afferents from several extero-
ceptive  sensory  regions  (occipital,  audit-
ory, somatosensory, gustatory, and olfact-
ory cortex) and, at the same time, affer-
ents  from other  interoceptive  subcortical
regions. In addition, the PAG and the col-
liculi are connected with the cortical mid-
line structures (CMS). (2009, p. 201)
Like  Damasio,  Panksepp and Northoff  believe
that the SC and the PAG play important roles
in instigating the core-self system because they
are the central areas where exteroceptive sens-
ory  information  and  interoceptive  bodily  in-
formation  are  integrated.  They  suggest  that,
due to anatomical convergence and neural syn-
chronizations  within  the  SCMS,  “an  archaic
scheme of the entire body may be constituted in
brain regions as low as the medial brainstem”
(2009, p. 202; my emphasis). 
Panksepp  and  Northoff  claim  that  their
theory explains what philosophers call the ‘ex-
periential self’ and the ‘primitive form of self-
hood’ (2009, p. 209). Self-related processing “in-
trinsically integrates affectivity, appropriateness
and belongingness, and the phenomenal dimen-
sion of mineness into the  ownership of experi-
ence” (2009, p. 199; my emphasis). This comes
very close to the sense of experiential ownership
that  I  discussed  above.  They  consider  self-re-
lated processing by the SCMS to be the mech-
anism not  only  of  affective  consciousness  but
also of the sense of self-as-subject. 
In sum, Damasio, Panksepp and Northoff
suggest that the sense of self-as-subject can be
explained  by  full-body  representations  imple-
mented by neural synchrony or by the SCMS.
Now the key issue is: Do their accounts really
specify the neural mechanisms that produce the
sense of self-as-subject? Or do they specify only
the  mechanisms  of  the  sense  of  self-as-object,
i.e.,  of  consciousness  of  oneself  as  a  physical
body interacting with the world? I argue that
they  address  only  the  sense  of  self-as-object;
they do not really provide a genuine account of
the sense of self-as-subject.29 Below I raise this
theoretical  issue;  empirical  arguments will  fol-
low in the next section. 
Damasio claims that core consciousness is
constituted by a second-order neural representa-
tion of the relation between animal and the en-
vironment. But this seems to require more ex-
planation.  Yet  an  explanation  is  not  really
provided by Damasio. I can agree that, for the
sense of self-as-object, one must not only repres-
ent the external world, but also the body. But
we cannot assume that the same account will
automatically apply to the sense of self-as-sub-
ject.  The  problem  with  Damasio’s  account  is
that the theoretical link between full-body rep-
resentation  and  the  sense  of  self-as-subject  is
lacking. And Panksepp and Northoff’s account
is afflicted with the same defect.  It  might be
that  full-body  representations  are  part  of  the
biological  conditions  necessary for  generating
the sense of self-as-subject. But since they are
also necessary for the sense of body ownership
and the sense of self-as-object, it is far from ob-
vious whether they are  sufficient for the sense
of self-as-subject. Let me elaborate.
Consider the full-body illusion mentioned
in section 1. According to  Blanke & Metzinger
(2009), this illusion contains three central fea-
tures related to self-consciousness. The first is
self-identification.  When  the  subjects  experi-
enced OBE during the experiment, “they felt as
if the virtual body was their own” (2009, p. 12).
We can see that this feature turns on the ques-
29 Cf. Legrand (2007) for a slightly different criticism of Damasio.
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tion “Is that body mine?” rather than “Am I
the one who is having this experience?” So self-
identification  is  about  the  sense  of  full-body
ownership rather than the sense of experiential
ownership.  The second feature  is  self-location,
which concerns “where my body is located in
space and time”. Again, this is about the spati-
otemporal position of the body rather than the
sense  of  experiential  ownership.  Blanke  and
Metzinger  call  the third feature  a weak first-
person  perspective,  defined  as  a  geometrical
point of projection and nothing more (2009, p.
8). So construed, even a camera could possess
such a perspective. Hence, this feature does not
specify the sense of self-as-subject, either.
The point is that, in the OBE experiment,
the  sense  of  experiential  ownership  is  not  in
question and hence not measured. This means
that  explanations  of  the  mechanisms  of  full-
body representation or the sense of body owner-
ship do not necessarily apply to the sense of ex-
periential ownership. As such, self-related pro-
cessing  can  help  explain  full-body  representa-
tion without explaining the sense of self-as-sub-
ject.  Damasio,  Panksepp and Northoff  neglect
the theoretical gap between full-body represent-
ation  and  the  sense  of  self-as-subject,  hence
their accounts do not really explain the sense of
self-as-subject. They suggest that the sense of
self-as-subject results from integration by neural
synchrony in the brain stem or the SCMS. But
it remains unexplained why and how this could
be so. To investigate these worries, I examine in
the  next  section  the  two  major  proposals  by
neuroscientists regarding the mechanisms of the
sense  of  self-as-subject:  neural  synchrony  and
processing in the SCMS.
5 Neural synchrony and subcortical-
cortical midline structures
Neurons in different brain regions may exhibit
rhythmic firing patterns.  This is  called neural
oscillation, the frequency of which can be recor-
ded by an electroencephalogram (EEG). When
a group of neurons fire together with the same
oscillation  pattern,  they  are  in  synchrony.
Neural synchrony is considered to be a central
mechanism of many cognitive functions. In the
case of conscious perception, multifarious types
of visual information are processed in different
brain regions, which need to be combined in or-
der  to  produce  coherent  percepts.  Many  re-
searchers suggest that transient synchronization
in  the  visual  system provides  such  a  binding
mechanism (Engel & Singer 2001;  Singer 2004;
Singer 2007; Koch 2004). In addition to vision,
synchronization in the beta and gamma ranges
is also found in the olfactory, auditory, and so-
matosensory systems, as well as in other brain
areas that influence (or are influenced by) per-
ception, such as the pre-frontal cortex, the mo-
tor cortex, and the hippocampus (Singer 2007).
However,  if  this  is  all  there is  to neural
synchrony,  it  would  not  explain  the  sense  of
self-as-subject at all. What we are looking for is
not the mechanism that explains what I  con-
sciously perceive, but the mechanism that pro-
duces  the  sense  that  I,  rather  than  someone
else,  am  the  subject  of  these  perceptions.30
Thus,  information  integration  by  neural  syn-
chrony may explain the content of consciousness
without  explaining  the  sense  of  experiential
ownership, i.e., it explains what one experiences
rather than who the subject of that experience
is. In the following I consider three recent devel-
opments  that  connect  neural  synchrony  more
closely with self-consciousness. 
(1)  Uhlhaas et al. (2009) recently sugges-
ted that there are high correlations between dis-
orders of self-consciousness and abnormalities in
neural  synchrony.  Symptoms  of  schizophrenia,
epilepsy, autism, Alzheimer’s disease, and Par-
kinson’s disease are related to dysfunctions of
synchronization. For example, correlations have
been suggested between reduced or abnormal al-
pha-  or  gamma-band  oscillations,  on  the  one
hand,  and  impaired  visual  binding,  auditory
hallucination in schizophrenia, and impaired lin-
guistic and auditory performance in autism, on
the other. The problem is that the sense of ex-
periential  ownership  is  not  itself  targeted  in
these studies. Researchers measured how abnor-
mal neural synchrony relates to impaired cog-
nitive performance, tather than to who the sub-
ject of the experience is.
30 The sense of experiential ownership is not studied in Singer’s work
on neural synchrony at all.
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(2) Lou et al. (2010) used transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS) to show that a medial
paralimbic network is crucial for minimal self-con-
sciousness.31 This  network may “bind conscious
experiences with different degrees of self-reference
through synchrony of high frequency oscillations”
(2010, p. 185). They tested three conditions that
represent different degrees of self-reference: max-
imal  (“Self”),  intermediate (“Franz”),  and min-
imal (“Syl”). In each condition a set of adjectives
were sequentially presented on a screen.32 In the
“Self” condition, the subject’s task was to make
personal judgments concerning how well each ad-
jective  fitted  him or  herself.  However,  none  of
these conditions are about the sense of experien-
tial ownership. Whether it was “I” who looked at
the screen and made the judgments was not in
question. Hence, the sense of self-as-subject was
not measured by the reported patterns of  syn-
chronization.
(3)  Kanayama et al. (2009) used EEG to
investigate the rubber hand illusion (RHI), and
found high correlation between the visual-tactile
integration process and gamma-band synchrony
in the parietal cortex. The stronger the subjects
experienced  the  illusion,  the  higher  the  syn-
chrony was. The authors suggested that RHI is
caused by gamma band synchrony. In addition,
a  study of  the full-body illusion  by  Lenggen-
hager et  al. (2011)  found  high  correlation
between alpha-band oscillations in the sensor-
imotor cortex and the medial prefrontal cortex,
on  the  one  hand,  and  subjects  feeling  them-
selves to be located in space, on the other. Un-
fortunately, these studies do not really tell  us
about the sense of self-as-subject. In these ex-
periments,  what  was  misrepresented  was  the
sense of ownership of a body part or a whole
body. Whether “I” was the one who was experi-
encing  the illusions  was not  in  question.  The
synchronization  reported  by these  studies  can
help explain the sense of body ownership, but
not the sense of self-as-subject. 
31 Lou et al. (2010) suggest that this network includes the anterior cin-
gulate,  medial  prefrontal  and  posterior  cingulate,  and  the  medial
parietal cortices, connected via the thalamus.
32 In the ‘Franz’ condition, the subject judged how well each ad-
jective fitted a well-known German football star Franz Becken-
bauer. In the ‘‘Syl’’ condition, the subject’s task was to decide
whether each of the different sets of adjectives had an even or
odd number of syllables.
As far as I know, no empirical study on
neural  synchrony  really  targets  the  sense  of
self-as-subject. We cannot explain the sense of
experiential  ownership  simply  by  describing
the  mechanisms  of  content  of  conscious  per-
ception, cognitive deficits, or body ownership.
The lesson here is that we need first to ascer-
tain that the neural information being integ-
rated by synchrony is  about the sense of self-
as-subject, and not just about representation
of the organism’s bodily condition. Unless we
know  exactly  how  the  integrating  processes
bring about that one represents oneself as the
subject of phenomenal or conscious states, we
cannot say that the mechanisms of the sense
of  self-as-subject  have  been  found.  As I  will
suggest below, the key here is to identify the
right  research  question.  And  this  is  where
philosophy can make contributions to neuros-
cience. 
The second proposal regarding the mech-
anisms of the sense of self-as-subject, sugges-
ted by Panksepp & Northoff (2009), is self-re-
lated  processing  implemented  in  the  subcor-
tical-cortical  midline  system  (SCMS).  This
mechanism is notably related to the so-called
resting  state  and  the  default  mode network.
Researchers have found that some brain areas
are highly activated in the resting state,  i.e.
when the subject is not actively engaging with
its environment (e.g. lying quietly in a scanner
with  eyes  closed  but  awake)  (Raichle et  al.
2001).  Interestingly,  the  activations  decrease
significantly when the subject performs tasks
that  involve  focusing  on  the  external  world.
These  brain  areas  constitute  what  is  now
called the default mode network. 
How  one  should  interpret  the  neural
activities in the resting state and the default
mode  network,  and  how  they  relate  to  self-
consciousness, are controversial issues. For ex-
ample, Gillihan & Farah (2005) point out that
different research programs on the self employ
divergent methodologies and implicate a wide
range of brain areas. Putting all the data to-
gether, we do not obtain a specific or unitary
picture, because pretty much the entire brain
is involved in processing the sense of self. This
and other criticisms suggest that we should be
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cautious when interpreting the alleged empir-
ical  evidence  about  the  sense  of  self-as-sub-
ject.33 
Still, many researchers maintain that rest-
ing state activities and the default  mode net-
work are closely related to the self (cf. Gusnard
2005; D’Argembeau et al. 2007). Northoff et al.
(2006) reviewed a vast number of imaging stud-
ies, and compared the processing of what they
call  self-related  tasks  and  non-self-related
tasks.34 They found that the data indicate the
same group of brain areas, including “the me-
dial  orbital  prefrontal  cortex  (MOFC),  the
ventromedial  prefrontal  cortex  (VMPFC),  the
sub/pre- and supragenual anterior cingulate cor-
tex (PACC, SACC), the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex  (DMPFC),  the  medial  parietal  cortex
(MPC), the posterior cingulated cortex (PCC),
and the retrosplenial cortex (RSC)” (2006, pp.
441–442).  These  areas  constitute  the  cortical
midline structures (CMS), i.e. the cortical parts
of  the SCMS.  Compared with  non-self-related
tasks, when subjects perform self-related tasks
their CMS reveal high activation across all do-
mains (2006, p. 450). The authors suggest that
the CMS correspond to the default mode net-
work,35 and  that  neural  activity  in  the  CMS
constitutes  “an experiential  self  that  mediates
ownership of experience” (2006, p. 441). “Own-
ership”, they claim, “describes the sense that I
am the one who is undergoing an experience”
(2006, p. 448),  which makes this account dir-
ectly relevant to our investigation. 
Legrand &  Ruby (2009)  argue  against
Northoff et al. that the CMS are at most self-
related, i.e. related to the self only to some ex-
tent,  but  not  self-specific,  i.e.,  not  specific
33 Another criticism is that, when the subject is interacting with the
world, the neural activity in the default mode network is not totally
extinguished. Some studies show that it is “reorganized in response
to the working memory task” (Fransson 2006). Others have sugges-
ted that it could “function to support exploratory monitoring of the
external environment when focused attention is relaxed” (Buckner et
al. 2008).
34 Many of these studies used a “judgment paradigm”. Subjects made
explicit evaluative judgments about first- vs. third-person perspect-
ives, own vs. others’ judgments, self vs. others’ decisions, own vs.
others’  personality  traits,  etc.  The  domains  that  Northoff et  al.
(2006) reviewed include verbal,  spatial,  memory,  emotional,  facial,
agency, ownership of movements, and social tasks.
35 CMS show a high level of neural activity during the resting state.
Non-self-referential  tasks  elicit  large  signal  decreases  in  the  CMS
(Northoff et al. 2006, p. 450).
enough to capture the sense of self-as-subject.36
Partly because of this criticism, but more be-
cause  of  new  findings  by  his  own  group,
Northoff’s view has changed significantly in re-
cent  times.  First,  Qin et  al. (2010)  recently
studied the CMS in patients who are in a veget-
ative  state.  Surprisingly,  by  showing  the  pa-
tients their own names, various regions in their
CMS were activated. Assuming that vegetative
patients  have  lost  the  capacity  to  experience
themselves as subjects, this finding undermines
Northoff’s previous claim that the CMS consti-
tutes an “experiential self that mediates owner-
ship of experience.” In fact, Northoff now agrees
that  the  neural  processing  in  the  CMS is  at
most a necessary condition for the experiential
self.37
Second, after conducting a meta-analysis on
eighty-seven imaging studies covering 1433 parti-
cipants, Qin & Northoff (2011) suggest that self-
related processing involves far fewer areas in the
CMS. It is the perigenual anterior cingulate cor-
tex (PACC), rather  than the medial  prefrontal
cortex  (MPFC)  or  posterior  cingulate  cortex
(PCC),  that  is  specifically involved in  self-pro-
cessing.  This  indicates  that  they  have  become
more cautious about interpreting data. However,
they still maintain that there exists a strong con-
nection between the PACC and the sense of self.
They argue that  “our sense of  self  may result
from a specific kind of interaction between resting
state activity and stimulus-induced activity, i.e.,
rest–stimulus interaction, within the midline re-
gions” (2011, p. 1221). That is, a narrower net-
work within the CMS is not just necessary but in-
deed sufficient for “generating our sense of  the
self” (2011, p. 1222). I will comment on this last
claim below. 
Whether or not Qin and Northoff take their
notion of “sense of self” to include the sense of
36 Legrand and Ruby indicated that the CMS are involved not only in
self-related tasks, but also in several cognitive tasks that are not re-
lated to self-consciousness at all. For example, their review showed
that some areas in the CMS are activated in others’ mind reading,
inductive and deductive reasoning, resting state, and memory recall.
Moreover,  these  areas  are  “sometimes more  activated for  the  self
than for others and sometimes more activated for others than for
self” (Legrand & Ruby 2009, p. 258). 
37 Northoff et al. tell us that “the neural mechanisms underlying SRP
[self-related processing] may only be considered a necessary condition
which is not sufficient by itself to constitute a self with its self-spe-
cific contents” (2011, p. 55).
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self-as-subject,  I  argue  that  their  meta-analysis
does not capture the sense of self-as-subject. They
describe the operational criteria as follows: “the
specificity  of  the  self  (e.g.  hearing  one’s  own
name, seeing one’s own face) was tested and com-
pared across familiar (using stimuli from person-
ally known people) and other (non-self–non-famil-
iar, i.e. strangers and widely-known figures) con-
ditions” (2011, p. 1211). The tasks in the “self
condition” include “trait adjective judgment, re-
trieval of personality traits, face recognition, body
recognition, personal thinking, name perception,
autobiographical memory, own feeling, self-admin-
istered pain, person perspective tasks and agency
tasks” (2011, p. 1224). All these tasks are about
participants making judgments about whether a
certain property may be suitably attributed to
themselves. From the first-person point of view,
the participants are judging whether the contents
of the stimuli accurately characterize themselves.
But again, whether “I” am the one who is experi-
encing the stimuli and making the judgments is
really not in question, and hence not reflected in
the data. Once again, the sense of self-as-subject
is not measured by Qin and Northoff’s most re-
cent study. 
I  conclude  that  Damasio,  Panksepp,  and
Northoff have all failed to explain the mechanisms
of the sense of self-as-subject. A theoretical gap
exists between neural synchrony and the SCMS,
on the one hand, and the sense of self-as-subject,
on the other. But it is important to see exactly
where the shortcoming is. It is not that neural
synchrony and the SCMS are completely irrelev-
ant  to  the sense  of  self-as-subject.  Rather,  the
failure is that why and how they are relevant have
not  really  been  explained.  This  is  because  the
neuroscientists  have  not  clarified  and  captured
the sense of self-as-subject well enough, such that
they  over-interpret  data  and  make  unjustified
claims about this target phenomenon. In this re-
gard,  my  proposals  in  sections  2 and  3 have
provided the required clarification.
6 Conclusion
I have suggested that the sense of self-as-subject
can be explicated by examining the sense of ex-
periential ownership, which is distinct from the
sense of body ownership. Having a conscious ex-
perience  secures  only  the  fact  of  experiential
ownership, not the sense of experiential owner-
ship. This provides a reinterpretation of the dis-
tinction between the sense of self-as-object and
the  sense  of  self-as-subject.  I  elucidated  the
sense of self-as-object by looking at the sense of
body ownership, and the sense of self-as-subject
by examining the sense of  experiential  owner-
ship. It became clear that both can misrepres-
ent. The possibility of misrepresentation makes
the sense of self-as-subject open to empirical as
well as philosophical investigations. It is import-
ant to investigate how misrepresentation of the
sense  of  experiential  ownership  is  generated.
This requires us to identify the right research
question—which, I suggest, is precisely the Wit-
tgenstein  Question.  When  examining  patholo-
gical cases or conducting experiments, research-
ers  should  ask  their  subjects  questions  like:
“Are  you  sure  it  is  you  who  is  feeling  your
niece’s sensations?” or “Are you sure it is you
who is shaking your own hand?” Then psycho-
physical  and  fMRI  experiments  can  be  de-
veloped  to  study  the  subjects’  responses.  As
such, to move forward, the first step is to look
for  and  then  to  study  the  various  conditions
about which one can pursue the Wittgenstein
Question.
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